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INTRODUCTION 
 
Death and happiness are not natural twins. Death to us often means the loss of a loved 
one and the end of something we value highly namely, life. And yet, death and 
happiness are not as far apart as we might think. Death can be a relief after suffering, 
can be a blessing if it is the peaceful ending of a long and fulfilled life. If you ever find 
yourself in a morgue, witnessing a post-mortem—as I did just the other week—you will 
notice that some corpses actually look happy, at ease. But apart from those of us for 
whom life has become unbearable, and for whom death sounds like relief, life tends to 
hold more promise of happiness than death. 
In Europe, assisted dying has only been legalised in four countries, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In many other jurisdictions, like England 
and Wales, legal change is being discussed, without any debates coming to fruition. In 
the academic literature and in the debates on a possible legalisation of assisted dying, a 
main counter-argument is the threat it would pose to the vulnerable, especially the old 
and the disabled. As such, the prohibition of assisted dying fulfils the safeguarding 
obligation the State has under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Right 
(ECHR), the right to life. However, this condemns a small number of individuals, who are 
wishing to die but are unable or unwilling to commit suicide unaided, to continue with 
what to them is an unbearable life. Further arguments blocking a possible legalisation of 
assisted dying are the sanctity of life and the fear of a slippery slope. While these 
arguments certainly have validity, this should not lead to the prohibition of a practice 
that could end unbearable suffering of a few –in this case assisted dying. 
First, Epicureanism and Stoicism will briefly be introduced to set the scene regarding 
happiness. Based on Epicurus’ theory that happiness is the absence of bodily pain and 
freedom from fear, it can be argued that the prohibition of assisted dying is protecting 
the happiness of the many by protecting the vulnerable, while condemning the few who 
wish to die to endure their suffering. 
Next, the arguments used in the English Parliament in debates around the 
legalisation of assisted dying will be introduced to show the conflict between the many 
and the few, before bringing the two together to see whether it is true that only one can 
be achieved, the happiness of the many or the happiness of the few. This article argues 
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that with careful safeguards in place happiness can in fact be attained for everyone. This 
argument will lean on the experiences of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland where assisted dying is legal, without there being an actual threat to the 
vulnerable. It should therefore be possible to further the happiness of the few through 
the legalisation of assisted dying, without an inevitable loss of happiness of the many. 
 
  
HAPPINESS 
 
Happiness is an elusive concept. Some would argue that being happy means being 
content, others would say being happy is an elated feeling, or that happiness is the 
absence of negative feelings.1 For the purpose of this argument, the ideas on happiness 
propagated by Epicureanism and Stoicism will be followed. 
 
Epicureanism 
 
Epicurus, a Greek philosopher living around 300 BC, promoted the idea that achieving 
happiness is the goal in life. According to Epicurus, the highest pleasure is the absence 
of pain. The main aim in life is to achieve tranquillity, called “Ataraxia”, ‘a state in which 
you are not hindered by pain or anything upsetting. You are functioning normally and 
nothing unpleasant is interfering’.2 
Epicureanism promotes a philosophy based on Hedonism: good is what is pleasant. 
But not all pleasures should be chosen. Those that bring an increase in further pains 
should be avoided. Also, ‘we prefer present pains to present pleasures if this brings an 
increase in future pleasures’.3 Epicureanism is not as selfish as it sounds, everyone 
should chose to be virtuous, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure that brings.  
According to Epicure, if one is leading a pleasurable life in the right way, there is no 
need to be anxious about whether death might rob one of time. The length of life does 
not impact on the value of life. ‘According to Epicurus and his followers, the sole good is 
pleasure. They considered pleasure to be noncumulative, so that, once made “pleasant”, 
life as a whole is as good as it can be, and death is innocuous’.4 A longer perfect life is 
no better than a shorter perfect life,5 so dying does not take anything of value away. 
                                                          
1 For a starting point on the answer of what happiness is see Kesebir, P and Diener, E (2008) ‘In Pursuit of 
Happiness. Empirical Answers to Philosophical Questions’ (3) Perspectives on Psychological Science 117.  
2 Annas, J (1987) ‘Epicurus on Pleasure and Happiness’ (15) Philosophical Topics 5 at 8. 
3 Ibid at 5. 
4 Luper, S (2013) ‘Exhausting Life’ (17) Journal of Ethics 99 at 113. 
5 See also Mitsis, P (2015) ‘When Death is There, We are Not: Epicurus on Pleasure and Death’ in Bradley, B et 
al (eds) (2015) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death Oxford University Press 200. 
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Since something that does not cause pain causes no harm to us, death is harmless, as 
without pain.  
More powerful than physical pain is mental suffering. According to Epicureanism, the 
primary mental pain burdening human pleasure is fear, especially fear of death.  
Epicurus wrote in Letter to Menoeceus, ‘Therefore, that most frightful of evils, death, is 
nothing to us, seeing that when we exit, death is not present, and when death is 
present, we do not exist. Thus it is nothing either to the living nor the dead, seeing that 
the former do not have it, and the latter no longer exist’.6 Furthermore, according to 
Epicureans, a short happy life is preferable to a longer painful one,7 which we shall keep 
in mind for the question of a legalisation of assisted dying considered below. 
 
Stoicism 
 
Another philosophical stream important to my argument about assisted dying is 
Stoicism. Stoicism is a school of Hellenistic philosophy which promotes the idea that only 
virtue is good. Being virtuous is enough for being happy. Happiness is the fulfilment of 
our rational human nature. Like Epicureanism, Stoicism does not believe that a good life 
becomes better by being lived for longer. ‘Stoics argue that a perfected life (a perfectly 
virtuous life) will be exhausted despite its persistent goodness, so continuing life does 
not better it’.8 
Stoics believe that a perfect person knows no fear. Stoicism promotes the idea that 
emotions result in errors of judgment which are destructive. ‘The Stoics did, in fact, hold 
that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love 
of anything whatsoever) either were, or arose from, false judgements and that the 
sage—a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection—would not undergo 
them’.9 
 
ASSISTED DYING 
 
In England, a number of Assisted Dying Bills have been introduced to Parliament, 
however, none have made it past a second reading. The following sections will look at 
the arguments commonly brought forward in debates. For reasons of brevity, examples 
will be taken from three debates, namely the ones on the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 
2003, the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 and the Assisted Dying Bill 2014. 
 
                                                          
6 As quoted ibid at 207. 
7 See ibid at 212. 
8 Luper ‘Exhausting Life’ supra note 4 at 115. 
9 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/>.  
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Happiness of the Many 
 
Prohibiting assisted dying serves the protection of the happiness of the many. This can 
be seen from the arguments that are used in debates on assisted dying. The three 
strongest arguments against assisted dying are the danger of a slippery slope—a 
legalisation on a small scale quickly growing and possibly leading to non-voluntary 
deaths—the needed protection of the vulnerable and the sanctity of life. 
 
Slippery Slope 
 
According to the slippery slope argument, in order to prevent cases of involuntary 
assisted dying, all sorts of active assistance in dying are to be prevented. The danger in 
permitting assisted suicide was for example stressed by Pedain who claimed that ‘the 
prohibition [of assisted suicide] is meant to protect vulnerable persons from acting upon 
a death wish which might be merely transitory in nature, induced by third parties, or 
related to personal conditions affecting the validity of individual judgments’.10 Slippery 
slope arguments are not totally unjustified, as legalisation can lead to abuse. However, 
the argument should not be used to prevent desirable and progressive change but to 
make sure relevant safeguards are put in place to prevent abuse. 
In 2003, Lord Alton claimed that in Holland, where assisted dying was already legal, 
many cases of involuntary assisted dying occurred.11 He concluded that ‘[w]e 
decriminalise; we move to voluntary euthanasia; we move on to involuntary euthanasia; 
and then, because it becomes so routine, we move on to non-reporting in some 50 per 
cent of cases’.12 In 2006, Lord Tombs argued that ‘it would be all too easy for a right to 
opt for a deliberate death to become a duty to do so for the sake of others. The 
exception would then become normal, irrespective of the real wishes and welfare of the 
patient’.13 This point was also made by the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth, Stevenson, who 
claimed that a possibility quickly can become a duty.14 In a similar vein were Baroness 
Finlay’s claims that ‘In letting this Bill proceed, we would be giving a message to the rest 
of the world that we will abandon the vulnerable and treat suffering by ending the 
sufferer's life. Let us get on with working for patients to live as well as possible until a 
natural dignified death and teaching others how to do it, not be taken up in becoming 
complicit in suicide’.15  
                                                          
10 Pedain, A (2002) ‘Case Comment. Assisted suicide and Personal Autonomy’ (61) Cambridge Law Journal 511 
at 512. 
11 See Hansard Vol 648, Friday 6 June 2003, col 1617. 
12 Ibid at col 1617. 
13 Hansard Vol 681, Friday 12 May 2006, col 1212. 
14 See ibid at col 1227. 
15 Ibid at col 1203. 
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The risk of a slippery slope was also stressed by Lord Hayhoe who stated ‘The 
Netherlands experience is relevant here, and I recall […] how our abortion law gradually 
slipped, without change to the legislation, away from a restricted right into, effectively, 
abortion on demand’.16 
The slippery slope fear can only be addressed by highlighting the absence of the laws 
and practices in countries where assisted dying has been legalised already. As the 
experiences in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland show, there is no 
automatic ‘slipping down a slope’.17 In order to prevent the slippery slope, tight 
safeguards have to be in place when legalising assisted dying, together with trust in the 
reasonableness of lawmakers and the morality of practitioners. 
 
Protection of the Vulnerable 
 
In combination with the slippery slope argument, the most widely used argument 
against the legalisation of active assisted dying is the threat it would pose to the 
vulnerable, especially the old and sick.18 It is argued that once active assisted dying was 
a legal option, people would be coerced into requesting it without truly wanting it 
themselves.  The fear is that greedy family members, or those burdened with the duty to 
care—whether in a private setting or State health agencies facing growing demand and 
declining budgets—would take the option of active assisted dying as an easy way out of 
their responsibility, and by persuading the old or sick person into asking for death could 
get rid of the unwanted obligation.  
Lord Turnberg for example saw the legalisation of assisted dying as a threat to 
vulnerable people, arguing that, ‘The probability of a risk to the aged, the disabled and 
the depressed, who will feel a burden to others despite the safeguards in the Bill, seem 
to me too high. The finality of that risk, the termination of a person's life, is too 
severe’.19 Lord Elton showed practical concerns stemming from his experience as a 
former Minister of Health: Decisions on policies are always connected to funding. 
Therefore, since palliative care is more expensive than assisted suicide, the legalisation 
of assisted dying would be a threat to the vulnerable.20 
In 2014, Baroness O’Cathain claimed that ‘there is a grave danger that if the 
[assisted dying] Bill were to be enacted, the vulnerable would be the most negatively 
affected. We are talking about the vulnerable as if they are the subject and object of the 
                                                          
16 Ibid at col 1246. 
17 See for example Francis, N ‘Assisted Dying Practice in Benelux: Whitepaper 1’ Dying for choice 13th 
November 2016. 
18 This view is for example held by John Keown. To him the wish of the majority to continue living and be 
protected from threats should trump the wish of a minority to have the freedom to ask for death. See Jackson 
and Keown (2011) Debating Euthanasia Hart at 97. 
19 Hansard Vol 681 supra note 13 at col 1208. 
20 See ibid at col 1213-14. 
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Bill, but we are not going through the effect on the individuals’.21 It would be too easy to 
simply dismiss this concern. Liberties always carry the danger of being used against 
someone by a stronger party hoping to profit from that in some way. It is not only 
imaginable but also likely that someone will try to coerce someone else into requesting 
assisted dying, or that an individual feels herself or himself to be a burden and therefore 
requests assistance in dying without actually desiring to be dead. However, a prohibition 
of active assisted dying is not the solution to draw from this fear. It should be possible to 
introduce safeguards that will make sure that most deaths are truly voluntary. Abuse can 
never be wholly prevented, but that should not stop the introduction of a much needed 
right to die. 
Also a robust counterargument to the fear of a slippery slope which poses a danger 
to the vulnerable, is that we still retain our moral values. It is not evident why the 
possibility of an assisted death for someone willing to die should then lead to society 
tolerating people being killed who do not wish to die.22 Legal dangers do not 
automatically lead to moral acceptance.   
While some fear of the old and vulnerable is understandable, a Bill introduced should 
have working safeguards in place that enable suffering individuals to receive help, while 
protecting those who wish to live. 
 
Sanctity of Life 
 
Lastly, the sanctity of life is usually used as an argument against active assisted dying—
or any other life-shortening measure for that matter. The claim is that life is sacred—
either due to religious reasoning, i.e. because it is given by God, or because of its 
intrinsic value. According to Dworkin, ‘a premature death is bad in itself, even when it is 
not bad for any particular person’.23 It is true that life is something special, with a worth 
above other things. But we cannot condemn people to suffer because we view their life 
as being sacred, if they themselves do not wish to live that life anymore. There should 
be a way to waive one’s right to life, even if it is seen as something special or indeed 
sacred. A way to accommodate both the idea that life is sacred but also the idea that 
one can want to give it up would be to approach the value of life in the manner that 
Dworkin does in Life’s Dominion. He differentiates between intrinsic value and personal 
value. While the intrinsic value applies to every human life—regardless of age, health, 
personal situation, etc—personal value gets attributed by the person living the life in 
question. This view entails that intrinsic value cannot be done away with, it is part of 
                                                          
21 See Hansard Vol 755, Friday 18 July 2014, col 801. 
22 See for example Brassington, I (2008) ‘Five Words for Assisted Dying’, (27) Law and Philosophy 415 at 430. 
23 Dworkin, R (1993) Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia HarperCollins at 69. 
Prematurity of course depends on the viewpoint, the person wishing to die would probably not see their death 
as being premature. 
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being human and seems to be linked to dignity. Personal value, however, is highly 
subjective and can change. It grows with the development of personality and can 
diminish due to personal losses and tragedies, illnesses or just age. While the intrinsic 
value therefore remains, the personal one varies and can even be completely lost. While 
accepting the intrinsic value, the loss of the personal value should then allow for the 
person to seek death. The intrinsic value should consequently not weigh more heavily 
than the personal one.  
The sanctity of life claim—when based on religious views—implies that life is given by 
God and can therefore only be taken away by God.24 While living one’s life, one always 
‘belonged’ to God;25 one was only the custodian but not the owner of one’s life.26 To 
Harries, the gift of life remained precious even in suffering, and in his view a Christian 
should not seek an earlier than naturally caused death.27 A religious person may hold a 
view on life and death based on their religion. Therefore, if a God prohibits a certain way 
of dying, it must be avoided by that individual (if possible and not harming anyone else). 
However, a religious view should not be used to create a law in a secular society so that 
a religious belief can prevent an individual from acting on their informed wish to die.28 
So while MPs are of course influenced by their own personal beliefs and religious values, 
the decisions they make must be applicable to society as a whole.29 As Jackson has 
claimed, the sanctity of life argument preventing any form of suicide should only apply to 
people whose religious views endorse this understanding.30 According to Jackson, the 
monopoly on life and death now rests with the medical profession rather than with 
God.31 Furthermore, what seems tolerable for one individual might not be tolerable to 
another,32 so there should not be one prohibition valid for everyone, no matter their 
individual belief. According to Hoerster, the religious rejection of assisted dying was 
illogical in that it would mean that God approved of (legal) death penalty or killings in 
war, but not of assisted dying.33 A religious rejection could only be a weak one in a 
modern, secular society.34  
                                                          
24 See for example Harries, R (2010) Questions of Life and Death. Christian Faith and Medical Intervention 
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge at 99. 
25 See for example Kreß, H (2012) Ärztlich Assistierter Suizid. Das Grundrecht von Patienten auf 
Selbstbestimmung und die Sicht von Religionen und Kirchen – ein Unaufhebbarer Gegensatz? [Physician 
Assisted Suicide. The Fundamental Right to Self-Determination of Patients and the View Held by Religion and 
Church – an Irresolvable Conflict?] Zentrum für Medizinische Ethik at 6. 
26 See ibid at 9. 
27 See Harries Questions of Life and Death supra note 24 at 119. 
28 This view is for example held by McLean, S (2007) Assisted Dying: Reflections on the Need for Law Reform 
Routledge at 30. 
29 See Wicks, E (2009) ‘Religion, Law and Medicine: Legislating on Birth and Death in a Christian State’ (17) 
Medical Law Review 410 at 431. Of course this claim has some difficulties to it when it comes to religious peers 
in the House of Lords, appointed for their status as bishop or chief rabbi.  
30 See Jackson and Keown Debating Euthanasia supra note 18 at 37. 
31 See ibid at 38. 
32 See ibid at 41. 
33 Hoerster, N (1998) Sterbehilfe im Säkularen Staat [Assisted Dying in a Secular State] Suhrkamp at 20. 
34 Ibid. 
8 
 
In the debates, legalising assisted dying is specifically opposed by individuals holding 
strong religious beliefs. Baroness Masham, for example, used the Biblical commandment 
‘Thou shalt not kill’ as an argument against the Bill.35 Likewise, Lord Ahmed relied on his 
religious believes in making his argument. ‘As Muslims, we believe that life is sacred and 
that only God, the creator of all, is the owner of life. Like all other Abrahamic faiths, we 
believe that only almighty God will decide about the life end of each one of us’.36 The 
Lord Bishop of St Albans, Herbert, also condemned the Bill due to his religious values. ‘I 
believe, as a Christian, in the profound and inalienable sanctity of human life. I recognise 
that that is a view shared by some humanists and members of other faiths. I believe 
that our life is God-given and that the purpose of our lives is not terminated by death’.37  
Lord St John again employed a highly religious argumentation in the debate of 2006. 
He claimed that ‘the end of life, the last period of life, is not a wasteland necessarily. It 
can be a wonderful period of renewal, reconciliation and acceptance’.38 The sanctity of 
life argument is generally used as a counter-argument to that of personal autonomy. As 
Lord Alton stated, ‘”Autonomy” is one of the buzz words of the pro-euthanasia lobby and 
can clearly be seen in the wording of the Bill. However, autonomy is not an absolute 
right that each of us, as individuals, can exercise while living in our own little bubbles’.39 
These examples from debates on Bills to legalise assisted dying in the English 
parliament demonstrate how the happiness of the many is being used as an argument 
against the legalisation. However, equally, in every debate, arguments in favour of the 
happiness of the few are being made. 
 
Happiness of the Few 
 
Legalising assisted dying would give happiness to a small group of suffering individuals, 
by allowing for them to put an end to their pain and suffering. The main arguments in 
favour of assisted dying are the dignity and autonomy of the suffering individual as well 
as equality in being able to set an end to life at a chosen time. 
 
Dignity 
 
One of the strongest arguments in favour of active assisted dying is the right to a 
dignified life. If taken seriously, this should also include a dignified dying process, since 
dying is part of life. While it can be argued that death is the antithesis to life, it should 
really be seen as being part of it. Dignity should translate to a respect for life not in the 
                                                          
35 See Hansard Vol 648 supra note 11 at col 1634. 
36 Ibid at col 1641. 
37 Ibid at col 1654. 
38 Hansard Vol 681 supra note 13 at col 1196. 
39 Hansard Vol 648 supra note 11 at col 1617. 
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abstract but connected to the individual personality. Consequently, dignity should not be 
used as a prohibition of practices leading to death. The dignity of the individual asks for 
their choice to be respected. What a person understands under a dignified death is as 
individual as a dignified life. The argument of dignity is therefore tightly linked to that of 
autonomy.40 
This common argument in favour of assisted dying was, for example, stressed by 
Lord Gray in his support for the Bill, ‘Dignity in death is something to which everyone is 
entitled, but there is precious little dignity in having to continue to suffer the pain, 
mental agony and the indignity of the loss of control of one's bodily functions, 
sometimes for a period of months or even years’.41  
For Baroness Flather, the 2003 Bill was about being able to choose a way of dying, ‘I 
do fear what is known as a bad death. I think that that is what we are talking about 
today. We are not talking about getting rid of vulnerable people’.42 She also brought up 
the need to rethink the current stance on assisted dying based on the fact that changes 
in medicine have prolonged the average lifespan. ‘In the past few years life has been 
prolonged enormously, but the quality of life and the control of some diseases has not 
improved with that’.43 
Lord Taverne claimed, ‘I support the Bill because, if it were passed, it would make 
this country a more compassionate and civilised society’.44 This can be seen as an 
argument based on dignity, as the compassion is needed to bring about a dignified 
death. Lord Russell-Johnston referred to Pretty45 in arguing for a right to a dignified, 
autonomous end, ‘I cannot understand the attitude of those who for ideological or 
theological reasons are prepared to deny people such as Diane Pretty the right to end 
their misery by their own choice. They should have that right. Those who oppose the Bill 
are also denying choice’.46  
Lord Laing would want that possibility of choice for everyone, including himself, ‘To 
deny me the legal benefit of a painless and dignified death, putting an end to terminal 
indignities would seem to me to be a high degree of bureaucratic arrogance and morally 
questionable’.47 In 2014, Lord Brit stated that ‘[a] civilised society must offer, too, 
expert advice and support to ensure that the individuals who have made that choice can 
                                                          
40 See for example Biggs, H (2001) Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law Hart, who claimed that 
autonomy and self-determination were ‘key factors in conflating euthanasia and dignity’, at 149. 
41 Hansard Vol 648 supra note 11 at col 1649. 
42 Ibid at col 1663. 
43 Ibid at col 1664. 
44 Ibid at col 1624. 
45 [2001] EWHC Admin 705, 31 August 2001, [2001] EWHC Admin 788, 18 October 2001, [2001] UKHL 61, 29 
November 2001, and ECtHR application no. 2346/02, 29 April 2002. Dianne Pretty had asked the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) to grant her husband immunity from prosecution should he accompany her to 
Switzerland in order to be able to commit suicide with the help of Dignitas. This kind of assistance is prohibited 
under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. The DPP refused, which was upheld by the courts, as no immunity can 
be given before an act has been carried out. 
46 Hansard Vol 648 supra note 11 at col 1633-4. 
47 Ibid at col 1638. 
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reach the last and gravest of life’s milestones with dignity and certainty’.48 Or as 
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon put it, ‘For me, the goal must be to allow people who are 
suffering at the end of their life to choose to die. This, I believe, is a matter of 
compassion and human dignity’.49 What should be added here, is that people should be 
allowed to choose for themselves when that end of their life shall be.   
Dignity can be seen as looming large in the dying-debate since it is a powerful 
foundation to the general idea of human rights. If it is seen as being part of being 
human and the basis for human rights then it can be taken to condemn assisted dying— 
because dignity is a foundation for the right to life and the protection of each person’s 
life—and at the same time as favouring assisted dying to help end a dignified life in a 
dignified manner.  
 
Autonomy 
 
Another strong argument in favour of active assisted dying is that of autonomy. We 
seem to aspire to live our lives as autonomously as possible. We see it as part of our 
human nature to be able to decide freely how to live our lives. Being limited by duties 
and obligations seems frustrating, especially when young, and only becomes acceptable 
with maturing. However, being fully dependent on others is something most of us would 
despise. And yet, it can happen to all of us. Illnesses and disabilities are something 
nobody is safe from. But even when dependent on others, we want to be in control of 
ourselves as much as possible. This can lead to the wish to also be in control of how and 
when to die. Most of us probably wish for a natural death of old age after a long and 
fulfilled life. And most people do not want to actively end their lives even when severely 
ill or suffering. But for some the wish exists to decide freely when and how to end their 
life. 
What is problematic with the autonomy argument in the assisted dying debate is, 
that, if taken seriously, it would have to mean that assisted dying had to be available to 
everyone who is wishing to die but being unable to kill themselves, regardless of 
whether they were terminally ill or not.50 Limiting the offer to those terminally ill is 
meant to refute slippery slope claims. However, based on autonomy (and likewise 
dignity and equality), assisted dying would have to be available to everyone incapable of 
committing suicide unaided.51 
                                                          
48 Hansard Vol 755 supra note 21 at col 803. 
49 Ibid at col 833. 
50 See for example Price, D (2009) ‘What Shape to Euthanasia after Bland? Historical, Contemporary and 
Futuristic Paradigms’ (125) Law Quarterly Review 142 at 163. 
51 It could even be argued that it should then be available to everyone, whether able to commit suicide unaided 
or not, in order to provide everyone with the same option of a dignified death. 
11 
 
Very rarely is autonomy used in opposition to assisted dying. The claim then would 
be that acknowledging the free will of a free individual cannot lead to its extinction.52 A 
more logical view of autonomy would allow for the free individual to will his/her own 
extinction. According to Antoine, asking for assistance in dying did not mean giving up 
ones autonomy but was an act of self-determination.53 After all, an individual is allowed 
to make decisions even if they harm that individual. The harm should be accepted to go 
as far as death. 
Lord Lester stressed both the main arguments in favour of assisted dying, autonomy 
and dignity, ‘Patients have the right to life. They also have the right to personal 
autonomy and to live and die with dignity’.54 Supporting the Bill to him did not mean 
ignoring the sanctity of life. ‘This brave Bill does not deny the inevitability of death. It 
affirms the sanctity of life while acknowledging that there are other fundamental values 
that deserve our respect and compassion’.55 For Lord Plant of Highfield the individual 
should be free to decide on the time of death since ‘we do not have the moral or 
empirical certainty to make it reasonable to deny assistance with dying for those who 
clearly want to end their lives because of the level of unrelievable suffering they 
endure’.56 To him, the counter-argument of the intrinsic value and sanctity of life had 
little value since they would also have to forbid war and capital punishment.57 But most 
importantly to him, the value of a specific life could only be determined by the individual 
living it.58 ‘I think, therefore, that we do not have the moral certainty to deny this option 
[i.e. death] to people whose strong belief is that they need it’.59 His view was shared by 
Lord Alexander who stated that ‘an essential, fundamental issue in the Bill is the right to 
choice; or, as the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, put it so well in his opening address in words 
which I do not shrink to accept, the loss of personal autonomy’.60 
For Baroness Greengross, assisted dying did not devalue any form of life. Instead, 
letting someone choose on his own behalf, granting him autonomy over his life, meant 
valuing that life.61 Furthermore, against Lady Howells’ claim that assisted dying would 
lead to discrimination, Baroness Greengross stated the opposite, that not allowing 
assisted suicide was a way of discriminating against the disabled.62 
                                                          
52 See for example Lilie, H (2010) ‘Sterbehilfe. Medizinethisch’ [Assisted Dying. Medical Ethics] in Wittwer, H et 
al (eds) Sterben und Tod. Geschichte – Theorie – Ethik [Dying and Death. History – Theory – Ethics] Metzler at 
231. 
53 Antoine, J (2004) Aktive Sterbehilfe in der Grundrechtsordnung [Active Assisted Dying under Basic Law] 
Duncker und Humblot at 262. 
54 Hansard Vol 648 supra note 11 at col 1596. 
55 Ibid at col 1597. 
56 Ibid at col 1619. 
57 See ibid at col 1619. 
58 See ibid at col 1620. 
59 Ibid at col 1622. 
60 Ibid at col 1622. 
61 Ibid at col 1650. 
62 Ibid at col 1651. 
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In 2006, Lord Desai, who decalred himself to be an atheist, claimed that ‘Religion 
relies on fear and the religious love suffering. I am an atheist and I have no fear, 
certainly no fear of God or the afterlife. I value my life, but I value it for the pleasure it 
gives me, and as soon as I cannot derive any pleasure, I want to be rid of it’.63  
This sort of freedom, which is an aspect of autonomy, was also mentioned by Lord 
Birt in 2014, ‘In a free, secular society, my Lords, the presumption should be that adults 
are free to do what they wish, subject only to not impinging on the rights of others’.64 In 
a similar vein spoke Lord Alli: ‘I believe that I am the guardian of my own life; I believe 
that my behaviour is my responsibility; and I believe that, in the end, I should have the 
right to decide whether I wish to bring my life to an early close’.65 When talking about 
the value of life, Baroness Warnock claimed that there was no universal value, ‘I do not 
think there is such a thing, such a stuff, as life that is abstract and common to 
everybody. Everybody has his own life and values, each for himself’.66 Baroness Young of 
Old Scone stated that ‘[t]he Bill is not about pity; it is about power – the power of being 
in control of one’s own death’.67 
If we accept the idea of the human being as autonomous and free, then he or she 
should also be free to make decisions about his or her own life, even if they are 
detrimental to health and even life. This idea has been accepted in so far as patients are 
allowed to refuse treatment even if that is endangering or ending their lives. The logical 
next step would, therefore, have to be to accept a voluntary death wish and help people 
who are unable to do so unaided to end their lives in the way they desire.  
 
Equality 
 
Another argument in favour of active assisted dying is to stop the discrimination brought 
about by the current legal situation. It can be seen as discrimination that able-bodied 
individuals can commit suicide freely without facing sanctions if failing, while those 
incapable to commit suicide unaided cannot legally end their lives. This brings about 
legal problems for those willing to assist, be it doctors, family members, friends, or other 
assistants. According to Nietzsche for example, we have the freedom to want to die at 
the right time.68 Suicide therefore is an option of human autonomy.69 Taking that 
                                                          
63 Hansard Vol 681 supra note 13 at col 1258. 
64 Hansard Vol 755 supra note 21 at col 803. 
65 Ibid at col 808. 
66 Ibid at col 831. 
67 Ibid at col 870. 
68 See Nietzsche, F Vom Vernünftigen Tode [About Sensible Death] referred to by Baumann, U (2001) Vom 
Recht auf den Eignen Tod. Die Geschichte des Suizids vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert in Deutschland [About 
the Right to a Self-Determined Death. The History of Suicide in Germany from the 18th to the 20th Century] H. 
Böhlaus Nachfolger at 293-4. 
69 Ibid at 294. 
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thought further, if autonomy meant we were allowed to commit suicide, then for equality 
reasons it should also be available to those requiring assistance. As Battin put it, ‘control 
of one’s own death as far as possible is a matter of fundamental human rights’.70  
Often held against the discrimination-claim is that there is no express right to commit 
suicide, it is only no longer criminal. Since there is no right to commit suicide,71 there is 
no discrimination in not making assistance available to those unable to do it without 
help. This is the reason why a right to die is needed. The actual discrimination would 
then have a legal basis for claims to be brought forward.72  
Baroness David claimed in 2006 that the Bill was about providing for an option,73 ‘As 
a 92 year-old, […] I think it is patronising for opponents of the Bill to suggest that 
elderly people are unable to make informed decisions about their lives. If I were 
terminally ill, I believe that I would be the only person with the right to decide how I 
died and whether I preferred palliative care to assisted dying’.74  
Baroness Hayman also claimed that the Bill would give terminally ill patients an 
option since ‘at the end of life we need to show people love and respect as well as giving 
them physical and medical care. For some people […] that love and respect would be 
given and devoted by the implementation of the Bill’.75 The Earl of Glasgow even claimed 
that having that option should be a human right.76 ‘The sincere and considered desire of 
a terminally ill patient to be allowed to die should be a human right. Surely, and I 
address this to the right reverend Prelates in particular, God gave us free will. Why does 
God deny us that free will when it comes to the approach of death?’77  
Lord Gilmour, in 2014, pointed out the discrimination caused by the illegality of 
assisted suicide when he advised, ‘Suicide is legal and now the Bill's opponents have to 
explain why those who want to kill themselves because they are terminally ill and in 
agony, but are unable to do so because of their illness, should not be put in a position to 
do so, like all the rest of us. No amount of talk about palliative care will alter that 
position’.78 A similar argument was made by Baroness Warnock who stated that assisted 
dying was never intended to be or become a substitute for palliative care. However, ‘the 
law should be changed in such a way that they [a small minority who wish for assisted 
suicide], in their extreme circumstances, should be allowed to follow the morality in 
                                                          
70 Battin, M (1994) The Least Worst Death Oxford University Press at 165. 
71 An argument as to why there is no express right to commit suicide can be seen to be that it is damaging to 
family and friends. It therefore ceases to be a liberty right. See ibid at 278. 
72 Article 5.3 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) for example puts an obligation 
on States to tackle discrimination by making reasonable accommodations.  
73 See Hansard Vol 681 supra note 13 at col 1203. 
74 Ibid at col 1203. 
75 Ibid at col 1213. 
76 The right to choose was also stressed by Baroness Flather in 2014 who told the House about her disabled 
husband who ‘says that disabled people should always have exactly the same rights as able-bodied people and 
it will be their choice’. Hansard Vol 755 supra note 21 at col 899. 
77 Hansard Vol 681 supra note 13 at col 1240.  
78 Ibid at col 1204. 
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which they do believe, not another which would compel them to live against their wish’.79 
This view was also held by Baroness Greengross, ‘Most people do not suffer if they 
receive good, comprehensive palliative care. That is why I support it so strongly. 
However, we know that a minority do not. For them, this Bill, were it an Act, would bring 
a sense of security […] It is a form of insurance policy’.80 
These last quotes highlight very well how the legalisation of assisted dying would 
strengthen the happiness of the few, by addressing their suffering and offering them a 
way out of what for them has become an unbearable existence.  
 
CAN’T WE ALL BE HAPPY 
 
So why can we not all be happy? Currently, assisted dying is being prohibited in most 
European countries. Legalisation has taken place in Belgium and the Netherlands in 
2002,81 and in Luxembourg in 2009.82 In Switzerland it had not been a criminal offence 
since the introduction of the Swiss Criminal Code in 1942.83 Apart from those four 
jurisdictions, active assistance in dying is not legally available in Europe. This promotes 
the happiness of the many, by answering to our fear of a slippery slope and of dangers 
posed to the vulnerable while not allowing the few to be happy, who seek to end their 
suffering and thus reach tranquillity and peace.  
To appease this conflict we have to go back to the beginning of this article and the 
thoughts on happiness promoted by Epicureanism and Stoicism. What we can take from 
Stoicism and Epicureanism is that for one, the length of life does not impact on the 
happiness of said life and also that we should let fear dictate our decisions. Both these 
aspects directly impact on the legalisation of assisted dying.   
With a careful legalisation of assisted dying, happiness—in the form of relief of 
suffering—can be given to the few, while maintaining that of the many with the use of 
stringent safeguards. With coherent safeguards in place, no actual threat will come of a 
Bill legalising assisted dying. To enable the happiness of the few, as well as the many, 
England and Wales should pass a Bill that legalises assisted dying based on unbearable 
mental or physical suffering, as has been the case in Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.  
It can be argued that allowing assisted dying based on mental suffering introduces 
the problem of mental capacity. However, Halliday, for example, reports that statistics 
                                                          
79 Ibid at col 1221. 
80 Ibid at col 1240. 
81 The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of 28th May 2002 and Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act, 1 April 2002. 
82 Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l'euthanasie et l'assistance au suicide [Law on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide of 
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show that only few cases in Belgium and the Netherlands are based on mental suffering 
and that for safety reasons ‘it should be subject to a mandatory second opinion by a 
psychiatrist’.84 Similarly, focussing on Belgium, Van Wesemael et al report that 
‘euthanasia was granted less often when depression, weariness of life, or not wanting to 
be a burden on the family were indicated as one of the reasons’.85 So while capacity has 
to be treated carefully, there is no reason to exclude mental suffering from the outset. 
Admittedly, if the suffering individual is not believed to be in the last stages of his or 
her life, an argument can be made that their situation could change in the future. 
However, this should only be taken into consideration to some degree. If the suffering 
has reached an –for the individual– unbearable degree, then that is the only issue of 
concern. Furthermore, as a response to this argument it could be suggested that the 
Dutch and Belgian law be followed which ‘require that suffering to be unrelievable, an 
objective assessment and thus dependent upon medical opinion’.86  
A necessary safeguard is time. It should not be permitted to request assistance in 
dying and then go through with it almost instantly. In order to avoid, for example, cases 
of young people requesting to die because they feel that the pain of their broken-heart 
has made their life unbearable, a certain amount of time has to pass between the 
suffering individual making the request and it being granted. In the Netherlands, for 
example, a verbal request as to be followed by a written one, both have to be repeated, 
a second, independent physician will consult with the person wishing to die, before the 
assisted death will be scheduled. ‘Only rarely does euthanasia talk actually end in a 
euthanasia death’.87 
A vital question is what kind of age limit should be introduced. The two most logical 
variants are either having the age limit at 18 years, or alternatively not having an age 
limit at all. If one looks at figures from Belgium, where assisted dying is available to 
children, as well as adults, it can be concluded that there is no grave danger to the 
vulnerable in making assisted dying available to everyone. In the years 2014 and 2015, 
no one below the age of 18 has received assistance in dying in Belgium,88 the vast 
majority was between 70 and 90 years old, and the majority suffering of physical 
illnesses like cancer.89 In a study in the Netherlands, the rate of minors receiving 
assisted dying at the hands of a physician ‘were too low to be statistically valid’.90 
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Consequently, a broad legalisation of assisted dying based on unrelievable, unbearable 
physical or mental suffering should be an aim for the UK, as well.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Following the Epicurean and Stoics view that happiness is the absence from fear and 
pain, the legalisation of assisted dying would bring happiness to the few who are 
suffering unbearably. However, the current laws focus on the happiness of the many as 
the vulnerable are protected, thus addressing their fears.  
The debates around assisted dying must go on. However, the current arguments are 
too emotional. What is needed is a more rational approach to our fears. Looking at 
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland helps to address worries 
surrounding the legalisation of assisted dying, as the experience of the countries show 
that assisted dying can be legalised without posing a threat to the vulnerable or leading 
down a slippery slope. With enough safeguards in place, the legalisation of assisted 
dying will bring happiness to the few without diminishing the happiness of the many. 
 
